Violating of Individual Privacy: Moroccan Perceptions of the Ban of VoIP Services by Delhees, Tyler
SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad
SIT Digital Collections
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection SIT Study Abroad
Fall 2016
Violating of Individual Privacy: Moroccan
Perceptions of the Ban of VoIP Services
Tyler Delhees
SIT Study Abroad
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Communication
Commons, Communications Law Commons, Digital Communications and Networking Commons,
Internet Law Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the
Technology and Innovation Commons
This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please
contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Delhees, Tyler, "Violating of Individual Privacy: Moroccan Perceptions of the Ban of VoIP Services" (2016). Independent Study Project
(ISP) Collection. 2521.
https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2521
Violating of Individual Privacy:  





















SIT Morocco: Multiculturalism and Human Rights 















 On January 6, 2016, the Moroccan telecommunications regulatory agency, the ANRT, 
announced a ban onVoice Over Internet Protocol(VoIP)calling services such as Skype, 
WhatsApp, and Viber. The ban triggered sweeping opposition among the Moroccan public, 
opening discussion of digital rights, censorship, and Internet governance. Considering liberal 
democratic rights in the 2011 Moroccan Constitution and a history of censorship, this study 
analyzes the official justification of the ANRT alongside additional explanations involving 
business interests and the security services. The purpose of this study is to gauge the perceptions 
of Moroccans on the decision of the ANRT and provide a holistic explanation. Through 
interviews with three professionals, this study examines alternativeperceptions of the ban and 
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 Considering the waves of anti-establishment politics around the world today, digital media 
and the potential vested within mustered much attention. Social media’s effects on political 
dynamics in an age of globalization are hackneyed in scholarly work, yet the availability of new 
technologies is too often assumed. While cyberspace offers societies new public space and a 
forum for fighting injustice and violations of human rights, its ultimate potential only reaches as 
high as Internet governors allow. In democratic and nondemocratic countries alike, the governors 
have proven to be adroit in limiting the full potential of digital technologies.The Moroccan 
experiment with banning Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services presents a case of 
government meddling in the cyber domain and effectively limiting the degree to which society 
can utilize the technology. It is this juxtaposition that this study will examine while seeking to 
map expert perceptions of the Moroccan regulation of VoIP and its ultimate unraveling. By 
analyzing and comparingexpert perceptions, this research elaborates on the Moroccan 





The use of digital technologies and its socio-political effects have been amply researched. 
For this study, previous literature can be divided thematicallyinto that on free speech, 
surveillance theory, andauthoritarian reactions to digital technologies.  
 Discussing the limits of free speech in Moroccan society, Smith and Loudiyidentify three 
“red line” topics—the king and the royal house, Islam as the state religion, and territorial 
integrity—which have become de facto taboos in public discourse and grounds for state action 
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against citizens (2005). Although the regime of Mohammed VI has allowed greater freedom than 
the previous regime, these red lines remain fair grounds for arrests, detentions, and censorship of 
the media. Smith and Loudiyargue that “regulative control is exercised both through self-
censorship and the manipulation of information” (2005). Conceptually, David Lyon in The 
Electronic Eye explains self-censorship as a result of state surveillance and the public fear 
created by it. He puts forth Jeremy Bentham’s panoptic prison plan, further applied to technology 
by Michel Foucault, as a lens through which to understand electronic surveillance. Borrowing 
from Foucault, he theorizes electronic surveillance as gaining its power from the invisibility, 
uncertainty, and fear of punishment generated (Lyon, 1994). The effectiveness and enforcement 
of order is established through these means in surveillance in much the same way that it is 
established in the panoptic prison. 
In political sciencediscourse, perceptions of the effects ofinformation and communication 
technologies (ICTs)vary between the digital optimists and digital pessimists (Zaid, 2016). The 
digital optimists emphasize the democratizing effect of ICTs and their use as a public 
spaceparticularly during the Arab Spring uprisings. The digital pessimists counter with three 
undemocratic threats posed by the same technologies: Internet openness, surveillance, and big 
data. On the side of the digital pessimists, Bruce Schneier argues that governments and 
multinational corporations control the upper handand outweigh the benefits offered by the 
optimists (Zaid, 2016). Elizabeth Bryant analyzes authoritarian use of ICTs and illuminates how 
regimes enhance their power incyberspace,a “contested space”(2012).Explaining 
thatgovernments will utilize technologies if available, she quotes EvgenyMorozovwho 
proclaimed, “technology changes over time…human nature, hardly ever” (Bryant, 
2012).Moreover, Shirkyexplains the digital behavior of governments as a reaction to the 
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“conservative dilemma,” a threat to authoritarianism from the public awareness that new 
technologies create (2011). This public awareness is an element that contributes to the expansion 




 This study is designed to explore expert opinion on the topics of the ANRT’s ban and 
digital rights in Morocco through purposeful sampling. Data is compiled from academic and 
professional sources as well as semi-structured interviews with expertsin the ICT field. In order 
to focus on expert opinion, interviews with the Moroccan public are excluded from this study. 
Interviews were conducted with a digital rights activist, an IT consultant, and a software 
developer. Each was conducted between November 12 and December 3, 2016 and voice-
recorded for review. The semi-structured approach to interviews benefited this research as each 
individual was encouraged to speak according to his specific specialties. English and Arabic 




 Moreover, this study is limited by personal bias, the length of study, and language. First, 
my status as a foreign student with a temporary itinerary in Morocco contributed to the difficulty 
of contacting individuals and conducting candid research. This knowledge and recognition of my 
American identity contributed to the information obtained as well as the limited access to 
professionals. Second, this study was limited by its timeline. Individuals were contacted by 
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means of phone calls, e-mail, and Twitter, yet establishing contact and scheduling interviews was 
difficult within the timeframe of three weeks.Even so, I established contact and rapport with 
individuals who had been introduced to me through my advisor and academic director.Finally, I 
must also account for the limited use of French in this study. Not attaining a working proficiency 
in the language limited the technical articles from which I could research.  
 
Bias  
As an American student biased towards liberal democratic principles, my perspective is 
biased to frame the ANRT ban as an issue of privacy and national security. This debate in the 
United States and the revelations of Edward Snowden influenced my approach to this topic. 
Further, my position as a foreigner in Morocco affects the quality of cross-cultural consideration 
in this study. Recognizing the limits of this research and how my background affects it, I have 
attempted to present a candid and coherent account of this recent development.   
 
CONTEXT  
The ban and its lifting  
 The ANRT officially enforced a ban on VoIP services on January 6, 2016. However, 
implementation of the ban was gradual and unannounced months before the official ANRT 
announcement. Although VoIP services had previously been stopped without announcement in 
2014, Moroccans noticed that services began stopping prior to the ban. HananeBoujemi, a 
technology policy expert with experience in the MENA region, mentions that the baninvokes a 
2004 resolution from the ANRT seeking to protect the financial interests of telecom operators. 
While Boujemi does not have specific economic figures relevant to the ban, she notes that the 
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ban had hurt customer choice and the image of the telecoms (2016). Further, it is important to 
recognize that the ANRT, not the telecom operators, had the final word. In fact, both INWI and 
Meditelexpressed frustration with the ban and its effects on their images as many blamed the 
operators (INWI Withdraws from Maroc Web Awards After ANRT Banned Skype, FaceTime, 
2016).  
After ten months of enforcing the ban through telecom operators, the agency officially 
restored VoIP services on November 4, 2016. Like the beginning of the ban, reports of the 
ending of the ban surfaced before the ANRT communiqué. The ending was suspiciously 
preceded by the removal of the director general of the ANRT, Azeddine El MountassirBillah, 
which will be discussed in perspectives section. Two factors appear to explain the ultimate 
decision of the agency to lift the ban. First, COP22 meetings were held just a week later and the 
accompanying international spotlight likely put pressure on the state to modify the ban. Second, 
a Brookings report on Internet shutdowns estimated that the ANRT ban had contributed to a 
$320 million loss in the Moroccan economy(West, 2016). Most media outlets disseminated news 
of the report, and popular protests sprung up thereafter (MarouaneHarmach, personal 
communication, November 18, 2016). The ANRT officially described its decision in a statement 
saying, “The decision (to lift the ban) comes after the ANRT’s evaluation of the telecom national 
and international markets, the legal context and taking into consideration the requirements to 
develop a sector that benefits customers” (You Can Make Skype Calls in Morocco Again). The 
agency retreated from its original legal invocation.   
 
2011 Constitution, the Judicial System, and Law 
 Article 24: “Any person has the right to the protection of their private life.”  
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“Private communications, under whatever form that may be, are secret. Only justice can 
authorize, under the conditions and following the forms provided by the law, the access to their 
content, their total or partial divulgation or their summons [invocation] at the demand [charge] of 
whosoever.” 
 Article 27: “The right to information may only be limited by the law, with the objective 
[but] of assuring the protection of all which concerns national defense, the internal and external 
security of the State, and the private life of persons, of preventing infringement to the 
fundamental freedoms and rights enounced in this Constitution and of protecting the sources and 
the domains determined with specificity by the law.” 
Article 28: “All have the right to express and to disseminate freely and within the sole 
limitsexpressly provided by the law, information, ideas and opinions.” 
 
 The Moroccan Constitution of 2011 has been interpreted both as a defense of human rights 
as well as a specious attempt to bolster oppression while garnering international support as a 
stabilizing democracy. The rhetoric echoes liberal democratic sentiments and affirms what 
outsiders would define good governance, a category that many argue is a lifeline for the 
Moroccan state. All Moroccans are equal before the law. The judiciary is strengthened as an 
independent body. For the purposes of understanding what the document means for digital rights 
and the landscape of Internet freedom in Morocco, an analysis of Articles 24, 27, and 28, dealing 
with the rights to privacy and information must be made.  
 As is evident in the above excerpts from the constitution, individual rights to privacy and 
information are guaranteed to the extent that the law and the judicial system permit. Smith argues 
that these limits make the constitution mere rhetoric to impress international observers. In 
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practice, local organic laws are tied to the judiciary, an arm of the royal palace and state officials 
(Zaid, 2016). Although the constitution elaborates that the judiciary is independent, the king is 
still reserved the position of chair of the Higher Judicial Council (Smith, 2016). The judiciary 
also follows the Latin legal model from France, which contains a system of civil law rather than 
common law. The structure of a civil law system inherently privileges legal codes and legislative 
action over constitutional precedents (The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions).Thus, the 
Moroccan Constitution holds less power because legislation is the primary guide in judicial 
decisions.This fact relegates much authority to the judicial system, which is seen as weak and 
unqualified to understand technologyby some (MarouaneHarmach, personal communication, 
November 18, 2016). In any case,which legislation is guiding the judiciary on matters of digital 
rights and privacy? 
Most laws affecting digital rights and Internet governance havedecreased personal 
privacy on account of national security. For example, the 2003 Law to Combat Terror expanded 
the power of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and website owners to filter and delete content for 
the sake of national security and public order (Zaid, 2016). The law added to the Criminal 
Procedure Code and the Penal Code, providing a broad definition of terrorism and more serious 
sentences. Similar to the Patriot Act in the United States, this law justifies its provisions with the 
fear and uncertainty wrought by terrorism specifically after the bombings in Casablanca in May 
of 2003. Some human rights groups and the U.N.Committee against Torture have raised a red 
flag and accused the government of opening a secret detention center in Tamara where suspected 
militants are held and possibly tortured (Human Rights After the Casablanca Bombings, 2004). 
Digitally, the law has been invoked by the Attorney General to block news websites and arrest an 
editor accused of advocating terrorism (Zaid, 2016). 
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The Moroccan Press Code of 2002 also offers an example of repressive legal provisions 
that the state has used to monitor and prosecute journalists and activists online. In reality, the 
code expands the definition of incitement to crime and criminalizes any citizen found to have 
crossed a ‘red line’ as defined by Smith and Loudiy.Offenders are liable to 3-5 years 
imprisonment and fines from $800-$8,000 (Zaid, 2016). The legal framework having been 
defined, judges use the Press Code to prosecute citizens in the digital realm. Although it was 
removed from parliament, the Digital Numerique bill followed the legislative pattern by 
including justification for censorship of website deemed “inconsistent with the public political 
beliefs” (Kenyanito, 2015).  
 Applying the aforementioned laws in cyberspace falls to the ANRT.The ANRT was 
created as an independent body for liberalizing the telecommunications sector in 1998.Over time, 
it hasalso obtained law enforcement powers.Theking appoints the director and administrative 
board of the agency by Dahir or Royal Decree as is the tradition with most bureaucratic 
leadership positions. Because Maroc Telecom is the oldest telecom and controls the telephone 
cable infrastructure, the agency focuses on ensuring fair competition and access to the 
infrastructure by competitors Meditel and INWI (Zaid, 2016). The ANRT essentially promotes 
fairness for consumers as well as is evidenced in its reasoning to lift the ban. Scrutiny of the 
ANRT as an independent body has increased in light of the ban, the removal of its director 
general, and the lifting. 
 
Surveillance and Civil Society 
 That the government conducts surveillance on Moroccan citizens is clear when looking at 
empiricalevidence.Western software companies have a track record of selling surveillance 
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technologies to countries in the MENA region, and Morocco is no exception (Noman& York, 
2011). Leaked reports reveal that the Moroccan domestic intelligence agency, or DGST, has 
purchased surveillance software from Endace, a New Zealand company also found to sell 
surveillance tools to the U.S. and British governments (Gallagher& Hager, 2016). The purchase 
of these tools by the agency suggests that the Moroccan state is investing in domestic 
surveillance and jeopardizing citizen privacy. In 2011, the state was also revealed to have 
purchased a €2 millionsurveillance system named Eagle, produced by a French company and 
sold to the regime of Muammar Gaddafi (State of Privacy Morocco, 2016). Among other 
connections to foreign surveillance software, Access Now lists Morocco as one of the countries 
whose telecom companies have shown evidence of using mobile tracking headers to gather 
information on users (The Rise of Mobile Tracking Headers: How Telcos Around the World Are 
Threatening Your Privacy, 2015).If there had been doubts that the state has tried to spy on Skype 
conversations, a Citizen Lab report publishes evidence that Morocco has used FinFisher, a 
British-made technology that enables the secret recording of Skype conversations (State of 
Privacy Morocco, 2016). 
 Official documentation of these surveillance tactics increased in credibility with a 
provocative report issued by Privacy International. The reportdocuments the cases of four 
Moroccans who were put under digital surveillance by the government and experienced personal 
and professional harm because of their work. This report, which sparked a lawsuit by the 
Minister of the Interior, shows that the government as well as pro-government hacking groups 
have used cyberspace to spy on and intimidate journalists and activists.HishamAlmiraat, co-
founder of the former citizen journalist website Mamfakinch and a digital rights activist, 
expresses his perspective in the report: “Repressive regimes have understood that the Internet is 
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not something to be left in the hands of citizens. They realized censorship is pretty obvious and 
so those companies are offering them a magic toy that instill fear among people and lead them to 
self-censorship. The very thought of being surveilled led people to decide by themselves to 
withdraw” (Their Eyes on Me: Stories of surveillance in Morocco, 2015).Mr. Almiraat’s website, 
founded as a platform for the February 20th Movement, absorbed a Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attackin 2012, foreshadowing a rocky ending of the website (Their Eyes on Me: Stories 
of surveillance in Morocco, 2015). A few months later, many members of the editorial staff 
received a cryptic email that turned out to contain a piece of malware identified by its producer, 
Italian firm Hacking Team.Almiraat and the staffers reported the malware and discovered that it 
enabled the anonymous hackers with a keylogger and the ability to watch the cameras on certain 
computers(Their Eyes on Me: Stories of surveillance in Morocco, 2015).Other stories from the 
report discuss phone tapping and thesabotaging of social media accounts.  
 The production of this report in cooperation with a Moroccan non-governmental 
organization (NGO) evoked a pointed reprisal from the state.The NGO, theDigital Rights 
Association, wasfounded by Mr. Almiraat in 2014.After thereport gained attention, the Ministry 
of the Interior launched an investigation into the association and refused to allow registration of 
the organization with the state(Rida Ben Outhmane, personal communication, November 22, 
2016).The state would not allow an association defending digital rights to gain recognitionas its 
actions proved to reveal too many undemocratic malfeasants. In order to continue pressing a 
digital rights agenda, the association transferred its work under the umbrella of the Moroccan 
Association for Human Rights (OMDH). Still, Mr. Almiraat has remained vigilant and active 
with Privacy International and Global Voices, an international community of bloggers and 
citizen journalists.Beyond the OMDH, the National Commission for the Protection of Digital 
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Rights (CNDP) actively monitors, studies, and analyzes digital rights in Morocco for the purpose 
of informing politicians and the public (Rida Ben Outhmane, personal communication, 
November 22, 2016).Even though these civil society groups manage to overcome the state’s 
obstacles, they are limited. 
In light of the treatment of the Digital Rights Association, many Moroccans have lost 
faith in the Internet as a safe space. This causes degradation in the number of voices in public 
debates, and theauthoritarian culture of fearsucceeds in eviscerating the democratic capabilities 
of the Internet. “The well was already poisoned and it was very hard to convince people that it 
was okay for them to participate online again,”Almiraat testified (“Securing Safe Spaces Online: 
Encryption, online anonymity, and human rights,” 2015). In Lyon’s terms, the panoptic model 
eroded public trust while increasing fear. Further validating the fear of citizens, Moroccan law on 
encryption technologies ambiguously requires registration with a military body in order to use 
encryption technologies (“Securing Safe Spaces Online: Encryption, online anonymity, and 
human rights,” 2015). As Bruce Shneier argues, “Encryption is the most important privacy-
preserving technology we have” (“Securing Safe Spaces Online: Encryption, online anonymity, 
and human rights,” 2015). To what extent can Moroccans defend against state surveillance when 
the law limits the use of encryption?  
 
Digital Public Opinion 
 Digital public opinion orthe collective discourse generated by citizens on social media 
platforms functions as an extra-state actor in contemporary Morocco. Facebook is the most 
widely used social media site with 12 million users while Twitter remains a platform used by 
mostly elites and professionals. YouTube occupies a position as the most powerful form of 
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television and overshadows the Moroccan mainstream media. With a solid foundation of these 
digital tools, digital public opinion revealed its potential force during the 2013 pardoning of a 
Spanish pedophile that had been sentenced to 30 years in prison. The pardon of Daniel 
GalvánViñasparked a wave of anti-state protests online tagged with‘#mafrasich’ (“I didn’t 
know” in Moroccan Arabic) and ‘#danielgate’ (Aay, 2013). The energy and persistence shown 
both online and in the streets led to the revoking of Viña’s pardon, but only after he had escaped 
to Spain (El Dahshan, 2013). What is significant about this event is that the digital public opinion 
was able to leverage the voices of people and provoke government action. The mainstream 
media, elite, and established political parties are effectively obligated to respond to citizens’ 
opinions, and the traditional “equilibrium” is disturbed (MarouaneHarmach, personal 
communication, November 18, 2016). These events reveal the existence of the democratic force 
of ICTs that the digital optimists have emphasized. Indeed, Moroccan digital activism today has 
some potential to push back against the state apparatus.  
 After the ANRT decision, it is no surprise that public awareness and discussion over social 
media was swift and forceful.Users protested by signing online petitions and organizing 
aFacebook “dislike” campaign to voice opposition against the three operators ---INWI, Maroc 
Telecom, and Meditel. Collectively, the operators lost approximately 600,000 likes on their 
Facebook pages even though they were quick to distance themselves from the regulation 
(Boujemi, 2016). This public activity and generation of opinion by digital means only heightens 
the pressure felt by the state following the Arab Spring and is likely a reinforcement of 





 Throughout the time of this study, interviewees invoked three perspectives of the ANRT 
ban. The perspective of the ANRT, which can be categorized as a legal-economic perspective, 
holds that the ban served to protect the interests of the three telecom providers, Maroc Telecom, 
INWI, and Meditel. On anotherside, some believe that the UAE telecommunications giant, 
Etisalat, played a role in implementing the ban from its shareholding in Maroc Telecom. Finally, 
some suggest that the Moroccan security services influenced the decision. The lifting of the ban 
offers further insight into the decision-making of the ANRT and Moroccan politics.  
 
ANRT Position 
 According to the ANRT, VoIP services like Skype“do not respond to the required legal 
gateway” (West, 2016). To the agency, the multinational companies providing the free services 
should have to obtain a license to operate in Morocco or pay some form of taxes. Indeed, in a 
communiqué justifying the ban, the agency cites a 2004 law that seeks to protect the 
telecommunications companies. The agency has also put forth the narrative that the ban is 
merely for the sake of promoting fair economic competition, a contention that the minister of 
industry, commerce, investment and digital economy corroborated(Freedom on the Net 2016: 
Morocco). Others argue that the government via Maroc Telecom and national corporations owns 
the telecommunications infrastructure and has a stake in revenue (Mohapi, 2016). Indeed, the 
state owns 30 percent of Maroc Telecom in addition to the national railroad and national 
electricity and water utilities, controllers of 16,000 km of fiber-optic cables (Freedom on the Net 
2016: Morocco).  
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Some literature validates this position.Timothy Wu looks at China and Mexico wherethe 
governments had blocked VoIP services and been active in regulating cyberspace. He concludes 
with acceptance of the economic reasoning: “Leaving censorship aside, it is also true that some 
Internet filtering, like the blocking of Internet-based telephony discussed within, seems to have 
little to do with political control and much more to do with the protection of domestic 
incumbents” (2006). This research aside, interviews yielded a critical perspective of the official 
ANRT reasoning.   
 One interviewee explained that the ban came out first on 4G services, which had been 
introduced to the market just three months earlier. The ban was subsequently implemented city 
by city and without an official announcement by the ANRT. From this information, the 
interviewee believes that the problem of the telecom operators becomes “clear.” VoIP usage over 
4G likely increased and caused a quality of service issue for telecom networks. The thinking 
goes that the quality of service as a whole decreases for all cell phone users because VoIP calls 
over 4G puts a strain on the network. Be it a technically sound framing, he calls it an “alibi.” He 
also discounted the ANRT’s reasoning from the fact that most Moroccans already do not 
subscribe to monthly telephone plans. Even so, the number of Moroccans that initiate 
international calls is very low because family or friends abroad most often attain more financial 
resources or access to free online calling. Anecdotally, it seems that the ban must not have been  
 For another professional, the ANRT’s explanation for the ban simply does not provide the 
full picture. An IT consultant and digital media expert shared his disbelief in the logic: “I 
objectively don’t understand the decision…data is the future of telecom, not voice” 
(MarouaneHarmach, personal communication, November 18, 2016). He also mentioned 
speaking to a representative at a telecom company who said that the company did not support the 
 17 
ban because VoIP services actually benefit them. This anecdote, along with the retaliatory 
statements of Meditel and INWI, provides fodder for debate and looking beyond the official 
reasoning.  
 
Etisalat and Multinational Business  
 From a less popular perspective, the ban may be linked to the UAE-based telecom 
company that owns a 53 percent stake in Maroc Telecom. Etisalat purchased its stake in Maroc 
Telecom in 2014 and now operates in 15 countries throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia 
(Bianchi & Khan, 2014). The corporation has a history of disrespecting principles of net 
neutrality and access to information, having also allowed the blocking of Facebook’s Free Basics 
service in Egypt this year (Micek, Olukotun, &Chennoufi, 2016). Connecting the ANRT’s 
decision to Etisalat also gains credibility from a report released by Ali Amar at Le Desk. Amar 
questions the sacking of the former ANRT director general and recalls that the removal of high-
level government officials typically results after a public decision by the king (2016). He 
suggests that something more must have contributed to the sudden removal, possibly a 
shareholder agreement extending decision-making authorities to Etisalat. If the Emirati 
shareholders via Maroc Telecom were involved in the director’s dismissal, it is possible that they 
also swayed the ANRT’s decisions. The UAE has experienced its own saga of VoIP banning and 
conflicts between its regulatory agency and two telecom operators, one of which is Etisalat 
(Samoglou, 2016).  
 The Moroccan state and the UAE share a business culture as well as bilateral relations on 
military and intelligence matters. Extending the comparison to other business-orientedcountries 
in the MENA region, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have also blocked VoIP services 
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(Ben Mehrez, 2016). No direct correlations can be established; however, bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation and business culture offer reason to draw the connection of these top-
down decisions. The evidence connecting Etisalat and the removal of the former ANRT director 
shows that the multinational company has room to exercise power. Whether the other MENA 
countries blocked services for economic, security, or country-specific purposes, there is a trend 
helping to fill in the gaps of the ANRT’s actions.  
  
Security and the DGST 
 Connecting the Moroccan security services to the ANRT’s decision is the least 
documented of the post-ban discussion topics. It is true that similar circumstances have been 
studied in Egypt where Skype’s encryption capability was seen as burden to the security services 
(Bryant, 2012). However, the lack of overt discussion in Morocco demands speculation based on 
the context of digital public opinion, surveillance, and the February 20th Movement. To be clear, 
there remains no direct correlation between the ANRT ban and the security services. No official 
statement after the introduction and removal of the ban mentioned security. Still, influencers and 
professionals in information technology note that there is state “awareness” recognizing the 
security implications of social media and its use as a networking tool for crime and terrorism. 
That “the services are more suspicious of the Internet” most certainly stems from the role that 
social media played in empowering and advancing the Arab Spring (MarouaneHarmach, 
personal communication, November 18, 2016). One interviewee speculated that the Moroccan 
intelligence agency or DGST undergirds the decision even though the ANRT neglected to admit 
them (Ali Elouafiq, personal communication, November 24, 2016). When considered alongside 
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the sacking of the former ANRT head and the aforementioned context, this claim begets 
attention.  
 If the DGST coopted the VoIP ban, what would have motivated it to do so? First, Morocco 
has a national security issue with Islamic State cells particularly in the northern Rif region. 
Reports have shown that the agency has actively thwarted many attacks and even cooperated 
with foreign governments such as France (Morocco provided intelligence to help France in Paris 
raids: Sources, 2015). Logistically, the DGST would have an interest in minimizing 
communications in order to prevent terrorists from networking and coordinating attacks. This 
begs the follow-up question: why would the agency want to ban VoIP services specifically? 
Technically speaking, filtering VoIP communications is very expensive and time-consuming (Ali 
Elouafiq, personal communication, November 24, 2016). In order for a call to begin, the Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) must be followed, but thereafter, eavesdropping on the call is 
impossible. It would be technically practical for the DGST to lobby for or demand the complete 
banning of VoIP services. Users are then forced to use services that the agency can more easily 
filter including Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). In fact, many circumvented the VoIP ban by 




 Connecting the perspectives above to the context of cybersecurity in Morocco, the ANRT 
ban of VoIP fits into a larger discussion of surveillance and privacy in cyberspace. The aid of 
Lyon’s panoptic model helps to conceptualize surveillance and the effect it has had in spreading 
self-censorship in Moroccan society. Discussions with colleagues and interviewees confirm that 
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self-censorship permeates daily life and is a testament to Moroccan culture and the state’s 
incitement. Accounting for the presence of censorship in Moroccoand its semi-authoritarian 
habits, Shirky’s “conservative dilemma” helps explain the realities in Privacy International’s 
report and the formidability of digital public opinion. It is in this context that the ANRT’s 
perspective must be weighed against the explanations involving Etisalat and the security 
services.While fleshing out a single explanation may be impossible, this study draws attention to 
the many factors of the decision. If expert opinion holds any weight, business interests and state 
security concerns contributed to the decision. The lifting of the ban is a step in the right 
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APPENDIX: Informed Consent for Individual Interviews 
 
Purpose: You are being asked to participate in a research study conducted byTyler Delhees from 
George Washington University.  The purpose of this study is tomap Moroccan perceptions of the 
ANRT’s decision to ban VoIP services particularly Skype.  This study will contribute to the 
completion of my Independent Study Project.  
Research Procedures 
Should you decide to participate in this research study, you will be asked to sign this consent 
form once all your questions have been answered to your satisfaction.  This study consists of an 
interviewthat will be administered to individual participants in an agreed-upon public location.  
You will be asked to provide answers to a series of questions related to Internet rights and the 
ANRT ban of VoIP services. With your permission, you will be audio taped. 
Time Required 
Participation in this study will require 30 minutes of your time.  
Risks  
I do not perceive any risks or more than minimal risks from your involvement in this study; 
however, should you feel uncomfortable or unwilling to complete the interview process, you are 
able to withdraw at any time. 
Benefits 
Potential benefits from participation in this study include gaining knowledge on the status quo of 
Internet rights and governance of the Internet in Morocco. Each participant will be offered an 
electronic copy of the final project or a summary of results.  
Confidentiality  
The results of this research will be documented as an ISP paper and presented orally to the SIT 
MOR students and staff.  The results of this project will be coded in such a way that the 
respondent’s identity will not be attached to the final form of this study.  The researcher retains 
the right to use and publish non-identifiable data.  While individual responses are confidential, 
aggregate data will be presented representing averages or generalizations about the responses as 
a whole.  All data will be stored in a secure location accessible only to the researcher.  Upon 
completion of the study, all information that matches up individual respondents with their 
answers (including audio tapes, if applicable) will be destroyed.  
Participation & Withdrawal  
Your participation is entirely voluntary.  You are free to choose not to participate.  Should you 
choose to participate, you can withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You may 
also refuse to answer any individual question without consequences. 
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Questions about the Study 
If you have questions or concerns during the time of your participation in this study, or after its 
completion or you would like to receive a copy of the final aggregate results of this study, please 
contact me at tdelhees@gwmail.gwu.edu or +212 6 96 67 81 66. 
Researcher’s Name: Tyler Delhees 
Giving of Consent 
I have read this consent form, and I understand what is being requested of me as a participant in 
this study. I freely consent to participate and have been given satisfactory answers to my 
questions. The investigator provided me with a copy of this form, and I certify that I am at least 
18 years of age. 
 




______________________________________     
Name of Participant  
 
______________________________________    ______________ 
Name of Participant (Signed)                                   Date 
______________________________________    ______________ 
Name of Researcher (Signed)                                   Date 
 
 
Déclaration de consentement 
 
L’objectif d’étude  
 
Le but de cette étude est d'interpréter les perceptions morocaine de le decision de l'ANRT 
d'interdit les services de voix sur IP Skype en particulier. Cette étude contribuera à mon projet 
d'études indépendantes.  
 
La durée et les éléments d’étude  
Cette étude sera dirigée pendant une période de trois semaines. L’étude inclura les observations 
et les interventions  des participants en incluant leur travail sur terrain.    
 
Les risques 
L'étude n'a aucun risque prévisible pour les participants. Cependant, si vous ne vous sentez pas 





La participation à cette étude ne sera pas compensée, financièrement ou autrement. Cependant, 
votre aide est considérablement appréciée par notre équipe de recherche. 
 
Confidentialité 
Tout effort de maintenir votre information personnelle confidentielle sera fait dans ce projet. Vos 
noms et toute autre information d'identification seront changés dans la description finale, et 
seulement connue à l équipe de recherche.  
 
Participation  
Je soussigné, ………………………………………….., confirme avoir  lu les rapports ci-dessus 
et compris que ma participation à cette étude est volontaire tout en ayant la liberté de retirer mon 
consentement à tout moment sans pénalité. 
 
________________________________    ___________ 
                       Signature                     Date 
 
J’ai pris conscience que cette étude puisse comporter les entrevues et/ou les observations qui 
peuvent être enregistrées et transcrites. 
 
________________________________    ___________ 




Team de recherche  
 
Les chercheurs peuvent être contactés par E-mail ou téléphone pour n'importe quelle raison ; 
 
 
